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 Abstract 
 This thesis analyzes the impartiality of the policy effect of Section 2001(a) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). Section 2001(a) amended the Social Security Act 
expanding Medicaid eligibility to those making up to 138% of the federal poverty line. To do so, 
this thesis focuses on the population making 100-138% of the federal poverty line and four 
different groups of states. These groups were non-expansion states (states where Medicaid was 
never expanded under Section 2001(a) of the ACA), traditional expansion states (states where 
Medicaid was expanded as intended by Section 2001(a) (i.e. beginning on January 1, 2014)), and 
two groups of “delayed expansion” states: 2015-expansion states, and 2016 expansion states. 
 
The research questions which this paper addresses are: 
1. Were certain groups or demographics of the population in the 100-138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level effected differently by the Medicaid expansion policy of the ACA under 
Section 2001(a)?  
2. Did a state’s temporal decision to expand Medicaid result in a substantial difference 
between the same demographic in a different group of states? 
3. If either of the previous two questions are answered in the affirmative, did certain 
demographics behave differently across groups with respect to Medicaid participation? 
 
I find the legislative action of Section 2001(a) affected no demographic significantly 
differently than another. I also find that there is no substantial difference in Medicaid adoption 
between groups depending on expansion date if a state expanded Medicaid. In my findings, there 
is a puzzling trend occurring in the black and Hispanic demographics in delayed expansion 
states. These two demographics have decreases in the proportion occurring post-implantation in 
delayed expansionary environments. It is a puzzling trend I observe only occurs in the delayed 
expansion groups and only in the black and Hispanic demographics. I offer a specific 
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Lucas V. Reynolds 
Introduction 
 
An overview of the History of Health Insurance in the United States 
 
 The contemporary history of health insurance in the United States is a complex and 
unique story that dates back to the country’s post World War II days in the late 1940s. At the 
beginning of the Cold War, President Truman convened a council of his most trusted advisors to 
draft a plan for universal health care as part of his large post war legislative initiative called the 
Fair Deal (Geselbracht, 1999). Push back prevented this portion of the legislation from passing; 
thus, corporate sponsored health insurance as it is known in the United States materialized. 
Moreover, the structurally integrated large health insurance business of the American economy 
as seen today came to be in 1951 when the Internal Revenue System revised codes that allowed 
firms that sponsored health insurance premiums on behalf employees as “benefits” to classify 
these expenses as tax-deductions on their filings with the IRS (Geselbracht, 1999). 
 The legislative history of universal health care coverage in the United States had some 
significant developments through the latter half of the 20th Century especially in the Clinton era 
when, in 1993, then First Lady and later Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton spearheaded the 
campaign for the Clinton Health Care Plan. This plan was similar in its goals to Truman’s 
original Fair Deal proposition for universal health care coverage by a mechanism of mandatory 
enrollment in health insurance subsidized by the federal and state governments (Moffitt, 1993). 
 During the Bush era, several reforms to health insurance in the United States were 
attempted; however, they pale in comparison to the overhaul of United States federal law that 
would come under President Obama in 2010 with the passage of the Affordable Care Act 
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The Affordable Care Act 
 The ACA was passed in 2010 and was a massive overhaul of with the primary purpose of 
expanding health insurance for those not insured in the private markets, Medicare, or Medicaid. 
The legislative mechanisms to achieve this expansion can be boiled down to three major actions 
(HealthCare.gov, n.d.). They are as follows: 
1. Allow children to qualify for coverage on their parent’s plans until age 26. 
2. Raise the threshold for Medicaid income qualification to 138% of the Federal Poverty 
Level. 
3. The issuance of tax credits for private insurance by way of a federal exchange for 
families making up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level. 
The legislative success of Obamacare has been hotly debated in political circles. A 
behemoth of academic and industry research around the mechanisms aforementioned have 
been formed and the literature on the subject is developing and grows more voluminous 
daily. 
Expansion Provision of the Affordable Care Act; Section 2001(a) 
For the research that I am conducting here, I am interested in the expansion provision of 
ACA. Historically, under Section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act, the Department of Health 
and Human Services calculates the Federal Medical Assistance Percentages each year. It is a 
calculation that shows the federal government’s obligations to match a state’s funding to its 
Medicaid program. It varies from state-to-state, but the Social Security Act disallows less than a 
50% match guarantee. See TCA 33-4-105 Section 1905(d) of the Social Security Act. See 42 
CFR. Policy, 100, 8. Generally, it is at least a 1-to-1 match from the federal government. 
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 The Expansion provision of the ACA is essentially two-fold. The first is the legislative 
mechanism which expanded Medicaid access to those making up to 138% of the federal poverty 
line. Because this expanded threshold would increase costs to the states, it required state 
legislature approval for adoption. To incentive adoption, the ACA provided that the federal 
government would cover 100% of the additional costs during the 2014 to 2016 phase (assuming 
all states would adopt expanded Medicaid policy in 2014 when the exchange was established) 
and phase to 90% of total additional costs in 2020 (Geyman, 2015). To further incentivize state 
legislative approval, the provision mandated that if states did not expand, they would lose all 
federal Medicaid funding. This was ruled unconstitutional in 2012. See National Federation of 
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Summary of State Medicaid Expansion -- A Timeline 
 The figure below summarizes expansion by state and is current as of April 5, 2020. The 
orange states have not adopted Medicaid expansion. The lighter blue states have adopted but not 
yet implemented Medicaid expansion. The dark blue states have adopted and implemented 
Medicaid expansion. 
 
Source: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, published April 5, 2020. 
 Of the states above in dark blue, most adopted and implemented full Medicaid expansion 
on January 1, 2014 or shortly thereafter (less than one year). In this proposal, these states are 
referred to as having a “normal” or “traditional” adoption timeline. States that did not expand in 
2014 but did expand in 2015 to 2018 (states that expanded in 2019 are ignored in this analysis) 
are classified as having a “delayed” adoption timeline.  
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 This thesis uses four groups of states: traditional expansion states (ACA Section 2001(a) 
took effect in 2014); two groups of delayed expansion states (2015 or 2016 Medicaid expansion); 
and non-expansion states. The State Medicaid Expansion Summary Appendices shows a 
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Statement of the Problem 
Unintended Consequences of Public Policy in the Modern Era 
In 2015, the United States Congress passed some 115 Public Laws while the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh’s Federal legislature passed 17 Public Laws during 2015. In that same 
year, the German Parliament, the Bundestag, passed some 250 laws (Brammer, 2016). Within 
these 115 laws passed by the 114th Congress of the United States, there were millions of policies 
and rules each with an intended effect. 
 With Public Policy broadly, there is a tricky balance of ensuring that public funds are 
appropriated effectively while minimizing unintended consequences observed ex-post. A 2012 
dissertation by Andrew Friedson, now an assistant professor of Economics at the University of 
Colorado Denver, examines three examples of “public polices having consequences other than 
those intended when they passed. They demonstrate that due to the interconnectedness of the 
economy, the intended effect of a policy is rarely the sole effect.” (Friedson, 2012). Friedson 
examined the Texas Top 10% Plan, Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms, and the implementation 
of medical malpractice damage caps in insurance law. In each of these examples, Mr. Freidson 
demonstrates an unintended policy effect ex-post (Friedson, 2012). 
 My problem for this thesis is examining potential unintended effects of Section 2001 and 
Title II of the Affordable Care Act particularly related to racial and demographic disparities in 
the policy effect. 
Racial Disparities in Health Insurance Persist Post ACA Implementation 
Since the passage of the ACA, more Americans are insured. Before implementation of 
the ACA in 2013, some 44.4 million Americans aged 19-64 were uninsured. At year end 2018, 
27.9 million Americans in this age demographic were uninsured. This represents about a 6% 
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decrease in the number of uninsured in this demographic (Tolbert, Oregera, Singer, & Damico, 
2019). See Figure 1 for a summary of this data. 
Much of this increase in overall coverage is related to health reform; however, disparities 
still exist in the health insurance coverage in the United States. 50% of blacks, 70% of Hispanics, 
and 20% of Asians fared worse in post-ACA coverage, access and use of care in the United 
States compared to whites (Artiga & Oregera, 2019).  
 This report from Artiga and Oregera also indicates that the Affordable Care Act 
cumulatively improved health coverage, access and use for 40% of whites, 40% of blacks, 60% 
of Hispanics, and 20% of Asians (2019). See Figure 2 for a summary of this data. 
Problem Statement 
The use of care, access, and coverage of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians all cumulatively 
deteriorated compared to whites since the implementation of the ACA. I am interested to see if 
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The Research Question 
This thesis attempts to answer a question about the policy effect of the ACA. Defined 
broadly a policy effect is the effect that government policy and its administrative practices can 
have on something. My research focuses on ACA Section 2001(a) which raised the minimum 
Medicaid qualifying threshold to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level.  
 My research questions are as follows: 
1. Were certain groups or demographics of the population in the 100-138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level effected differently by the Medicaid expansion policy of the ACA under 
Section 2001(a)?  
2. Did a state’s temporal decision to expand Medicaid result in a substantial difference in 
Medicaid adoption between the same demographic in a different group of states? 
3. If either of the previous two questions are answered in the affirmative, did certain 
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Justification 
 The legislative intent of Section 2001(a) was that it would take effect on January 1, 2014. 
All states were heavily incentivized to opt into the program because their federal Medicaid 
funding was in jeopardy if they refused to do so. See 42 U.S.C Section 1396a(a)10. This 
provision was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 2012 (National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012) removing the negative monetary incentive 
for states to expand Medicaid under Section 2001(a) in their borders.  
 Relevant to the justification of this topic is the very public, partisan politics arising from 
the passage and implementation of the ACA. The Republican controlled House and Senate failed 
to repeal the law numerous times. By July of 2017, either both or one of the United States 
legislative bodies has attempted to repeal provisions of the ACA at least 70 times (Riotta, 2017). 
Research done by Marketplace estimates that the cost of single House of Representative vote 
with a quorum of Representatives to be almost $2 million (Marshall-Genzer, 2012). Although the 
research is not done by congressional oversight agencies, one could imagine that physically 
voting on a single resolution is extraordinarily expensive from logistics to paper to congressional 
aide overtime. If this $2 million-dollar calculation is accurate, it puts the cost of partisan politics 
on the ACA to be $140 million – just to vote. In 2016, it cost the average type 1 diabetes patient 
about $5,700 for a year’s worth of insulin (Biniek & Johnson, 2019). In other words – using a 
low-ball estimate of congressional spending, the federal congress spent enough money trying to 
repeal the ACA to buy enough insulin to treat 24,560 type 1 diabetes patients for a calendar year. 
 To conclude, the ACA is a complex, highly important piece of American legislation still 
being disputed in litigation and public opinion today. I am interested in studying the policy effect 
of Section 2001(a) in temporally delayed environments because the literature is notably less 
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Literature Review 
Overview 
This literature review attempts to narrow my research question by establishing a sound, academic 
basis for the analysis performed in this thesis. It will note assumptions and findings relevant to 
my thesis and its conclusion. Provided below are brief executive summaries of each subsection 
of this literature review. 
 Consumers and their difficult health insurance decisions:  
This section looks at a primary assumption of my thesis: all individuals (no matter race, 
sex, ethnic origin or education level) make insurance decisions the same if they are given 
the same set of options. This section acknowledges that this assumption is broad and may 
weaken the findings of this thesis, and in health insurance decisions, consumers may not 
choose the utility maximizing option. I believe, however, that by narrowing my research 
question to include just the population of persons qualifying for Medicaid under Section 
2001(a) the assumptions are justified as the thesis is just to examine absolute, substantial 
differences in Medicaid adoption. It does not look at the full insurance choice set offered 
to the individual. 
 Adverse Selection in the health insurance markets and the “Confusing” Insurance 
Decision:  
This section establishes that I need not worry about adverse selection in my research 
because there is little evidence to show that it will taint the data that I am examining here. 
It also poses an interesting question: can consumers choose rationally from a set of 
“complex and confusing” insurance options (Gruber, 2017, 10)? Gruber along with 
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another 2015 paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research suggests that they 
sometimes cannot. I acknowledge this as a part of my findings. 
 Section 2001(a) of the Affordable Care Act, A summary of research 
In this section, I examine the efficacy of Section 2001(a) of the Affordable Care Act. I 
establish the temporal decision of a state’s legislature matters from a health perspective.  
Consumers and their complex health insurance decision 
In health care economics academia, it is widely acknowledged the health insurance 
decision in the United States is difficult for consumers. It is complex compared to other countries 
like Switzerland and the United Kingdom where individuals select a plan of coverage from a 
small choice set, and it pay a yearly premium with some additional costs. In the United States, 
this is much different for public and private insurance participants. It is important to recognize 
this major concession in my thesis: the heterogeneity of the insurance decision. Suppose you 
have two individuals: A and B. They share demographic statistics as they have the same income 
(102% of the federal poverty level), the same income, same age, and are both single. This being 
the same individual A lives in a large metropolitan area and B lives in a rural setting. While 
individual A may have access to myriad of health providers who accept Medicaid, individual B 
may have to spend a substantial amount of time and money to find and travel to a physician who 
accepts Medicaid. Individual A and B may face discrimination if they opt for public insurance 
under the ACA; however, B may face higher transaction costs in choosing Medicaid. 
This introduces the interplay that effects all health insurance research in the United 
States: public versus private insurance choice. While those individuals who choose a Silver tier 
plan versus Medicaid may face the same cumulative cost of insurance, each has different reasons 
for their choice which census bureau data does not capture. These reasons are difficult to dissect, 
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but in his paper, “Delivering Public Health Insurance Through Private Plan Choice in the United 
States,” Johnathan Gruber follows the development of choice and trends in American insurance 
markets (2017). 
In terms of trends, Gruber notes “[e]ven absent Part D, starting in 2010 there was more 
enrollment in privatized plans. Public insurance in the United States is now primarily a privately-
run endeavor, at least in terms of enrollment” (Gruber, 2017, p. 4). Gruber spends the paper 
discussing the evolution of private insurers participating in this market which has “potentially 
wide-ranging impacts” (4). Policymakers disagree whether these transitions from single-payer to 
private participation is efficient for US health insurance markets.  
To sum it up, Gruber poses a few questions: (1) whether choice among private insurance 
options leads to adverse selection and market failures; (2) whether individuals can choose 
appropriately among a wide range of “complex and confusing options;” (3) whether a privatized 
approach can deliver the efficiencies proposed by advocates; and finally, (4) examining what 
policy mechanisms have/could be used to solve the aforementioned problems (Gruber, 2017, p. 
5). My literature review focuses on the first two questions listed using both microeconomic 
theories and the commentary that Gruber offers in his paper. 
First is individual choice among private insurance options. This began in the Medicare 
program with the option for enrollees to join managed care plans in 1985. This model stipulated 
that private plans would be paid a fixed amount by the government to cover all the medical 
spending of enrollees and a risk transfer from the government to the managed entity (Gruber, 
2017, p. 6). The paper goes on analyzing various developments like Medicare versus Medicare 
Advantage and Medicare Part D. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the interesting 
discussion of adverse selection that exists because of the establishment of the state-based 
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exchanges under the ACA. Pre-2010, individuals who purchased insurance outside of an 
employer setting faced a highly fragmented market with imperfect information (Gruber, 2017, p. 
5). The ACA tried to abate these issues by establishing a unified state-based exchange with 
metallic tiers for various plan types; however, there is a clear tradeoff in moving to private plans 
(Gruber, 2017, p. 6). 
This is what my thesis on one hand examines. Suppose two individuals, again, A and B. 
They again share demographic characteristic like age, sex, family size, race, and income within 
the range of 100 to 138% of the federal poverty line; however, in this scenario, they are not 
domiciled in the same state. Person A is a resident of Colorado. Person B is a resident of 
Pennsylvania. Let’s assume both are not eligible for corporate sponsored health insurance, so on 
January 1, 2014, each has a decision to make. For person A, the choice set contains exchange-
based insurance, Medicaid, or no insurance. For person B, the choice set contains exchange-
based insurance or no insurance. We assume that both cannot privately purchase insurance.  
Around two-and-a-half years later, person B’s choice set expands to now include 
Medicaid eligibility. As Gruber mentions, there are trade-offs in selecting private, publicly 
subsidized insurance on a state’s exchange. These are aforementioned in the paper like choice of 
physician, accessibility to care, and cost. The silver metallic tier provides people enroll on a 
state’s exchange, pay premiums, and are reimbursed with tax credits when they file. Medicaid 
has no out of pocket cost other than the tax collected which is unavoidable for either individual 
in our scenario.  
On one hand, the research question posed examines disparities between demographics in 
the policy effect of Section 2001(a) of the ACA. Although in the analysis no “exchange-based 
insurance” is analyzed, person B’s choice set expansion because of the Pennsylvania state 
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legislature’s choice to expand presents an interesting study of utility versus preference and 
transaction costs. For example, if person B had elected a silver tier option on the exchange in 
2014, would the monthly out of pocket premiums be enough motivation to prompt them to 
switch to Medicaid. They would have to learn new enrollment procedures, filing procedures, and 
change the way they file their taxes; furthermore, they also may have a reduced set of healthcare 
options including finding a new physician.  
I only look at trends in adoption and compare 95% confidence intervals in this paper. See 
Methodology. This data could be extrapolated to look at the situation posed above, but this paper 
will look at the different demographic variables in a narrower scope than the scenario posed. I 
examine if individuals in Colorado or Pennsylvania (and states like them under Section 2001(a)) 
made similar health insurance decisions, and if they did not, did different demographic 
characteristics cause disparities? 
Adverse Selection in Health Insurance Markets and the “Confusing” Insurance Decision 
Gruber offers some insight on the effect of adverse selection in publicly subsidized 
private insurance markets under the ACA. Specifically, he points to a 2011 article by Einav and 
Finkelstein that shows that “while adverse selection exists across insurance plan choices [on the 
exchanges], it has relatively modest welfare costs”; therefore, suggesting little market failure on 
the exchange (Gruber, 2017, p. 10). Gruber offers context to why this may happen. Allowing 
individuals, the choice across plans automatically puts pressure on private insurers to deliver 
efficient care. In terms of insurance markets, this issue is much more complicated because it is 
not as easy to define efficiency as it is in the goods markets. Normally, efficiency is defined in 
terms of, “producing at minimum cost per quality-adjusted unit of output,” but in the health 
insurance market, each enrollee has a different interpretation of quality (Gruber, 2017, p. 10). 
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Therefore, it is hard to put a value on what counts as efficient.  As a result, private insurers are 
incentivized to “target outcomes that are most valued by the healthiest potential enrollees” (10). 
 In this section, I reflect on some of the formidable microeconomics concepts at play in 
the context of this paper which arise in the research that I present in my thesis. In numerous 
places, Gruber wonders if consumers can choose efficiently between “confusing and complex” 
insurance options (Gruber, 2017, p. 12). Can consumers adequately choose between their 
options? The rational consumer assumption is at play; moreover, whether consumers can be 
completely rational in this environment. In that, if the consumer has a choice, their choice will 
match their preferences so long as adverse selection is absent.  
Adverse selection aside, I found an interesting 2015 paper on this subject which found 
inconsistencies in choices and preferences where consumers are willing to pay higher premiums 
to avoid large deductibles (Bhargava, Loewnstein, & Sydnor, 2015). This is congruent to another 
microeconomics theory: consumer risk aversion. From a behavioral economics lens, the average 
consumer would rather pay more in monthly premiums than have a large co-pay for a doctor’s 
visit. The aforementioned 2015 paper solidifies this reasoning as consumers feel losses (i.e. a 
$1000 deductible) more than a smaller but cumulatively higher and inefficient (from a classical 
economics lens) monthly premium payment. Striking a balance between choices and preferences 
for risk and health status is examined in the paper, and Gruber looks at three mechanisms to 
reconcile the issue alluded to in his symposium and perused by the authors of this paper in 
Bhargava, Loewenstein & Sydnors’ paper. First, he suggests compulsory re-enrollment, but finds 
this does not lead to improved quality of choices. Second, he tests a decision support tool, but it 
was ineffective as choice suggestions were ignored. Third, he examines the “choice architecture” 
where smaller choice sets improve consumer decision making (Gruber, 2017, 19). All of these 
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concepts connect to the rational consumer assumption and risk aversion principle in consumer 
decision making which are fundamental to any market but play a very important role in matching 
preferences to choices in complex health insurance markets. 
In summary, I pulled data (and inspiration) from the aforementioned research in my thesis. 
There is ample evidence that suggests that consumers behave irrationally when selecting health 
insurance. This is an assumption of my thesis. 
The Legislative Intent of Section 2001(a) of the Affordable Care Act 
 In this section, I outline the legislative intent of Section 2001(a) of the Affordable Care 
Act. 2001(a) and Title II of the ACA addresses the role of public programs in the healthcare 
reform legislation. Specifically, 2001(a) amended Section 1902(a)(10(A) of the Social Security 
Act. See 42 U.S.C. 1936a. ACA Section 2001(a) is: 
 COVERAGE FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH INCOME AT OR BELOW 
133 PERCENT OF THE POVERTY LINE.— 
(1) BEGINNING 2014.—Section 1902(a)(10)(A)(i) of the Social 
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is amended— 
(A) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of subclause (VI); 
(B) by adding ‘‘or’’ at the end of subclause (VII); and 
(C) by inserting after subclause (VII) the following: 
‘‘(VIII) beginning January 1, 2014, who are 
under 65 years of age, not pregnant, not entitled 
to, or enrolled for, benefits under part A of title 
XVIII, or enrolled for benefits under part B of title 
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XVIII, and are not described in a previous subclause of this clause, 
and whose income (as determined under subsection (e)(14)) does 
not exceed 133 percent of the poverty line (as defined in section 
2110(c)(5)) applicable to a family of the size 
involved, subject to subsection (k);’’. 
 Later in the bill’s myriad of amendments, this 133% has a 5% disregard; thus, those 
making up to 138% of the federal poverty line qualify contingent on state implementation. In 
2019, 138% of the federal poverty line was $17,236 for an individual (Garfield, Orgera, & 
Damico, 2020). The intent of Section 2001(a) is multifold; however, coupled with the individual 
mandate, it is a social program and an economic efficiency goal. As a social program, the 
expansion of Medicaid from per-ACA levels provided access to healthcare for the poorest 
persons. Nearly 10 million Americans have gained coverage under Section 2001(a) 
(HealthInsurance.org). As a social program, the ACA has offered the poorest an option of public 
assistance to help pay for medical bills and have the peace of mind that comes with having health 
insurance. From an economic efficiency goal, insurance depends on large numbers. Paying in a 
bit now to avoid large, unmanageable payments later works only if many people pay in a bit 
now. Insurance markets are notoriously complex and have problems with the individual 
incentive. Opening up insurance access to poor Americans was to prevent large payments if an 
uninsured individual gets sick with chronic illness. Healthy or not the individual mandate was to 
expand the insurance pool to prevent a death spiral in premium payments, a result of adverse 
selection where the lower risk policy holders choose to change policies or be uninsured. Section 
2001(a) coupled with the individual mandate required participation in the insurance pool.  
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 To build on intent of Section 2001(a), recent papers from Michigan Ross have linked 
mortality and Medicaid expansion data. The advisor for this thesis, Dr. Sarah Miller, has 
published extensively on the ACA. In a 2019 paper, Miller with others “linked federal survey 
data to administrative death records to investigate the relationship between Medicaid enrollments 
and mortality. Our analysis compares changes in mortality for near-elderly adults in states with 
and without Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansions. We identify adults most likely to benefit 
using survey information on socioeconomic and citizenship status, and public program 
participation. We find a 0.132 percentage point decline in annual mortality, a 9.4 percent 
reduction over the sample mean, associated with Medicaid expansion for this population. The 
effect is driven by a reduction in disease-related deaths and grows over time” (Miller, Alterkuse, 
Johnson, & Wherry, 2019). This analysis has been widely cited. Local, national, and 
international media companies have written on the research done by Dr. Miller. For example, a 
November  2019 article by Carmen Forman in The Oklahoman cites Miller’s findings in a 
headline: “Report: 476 older Oklahomans died prematurely because of Medicaid non-expansion” 
(Forman, 2019). A federal report from the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities bears the title: 
Medicaid Expansion Has Saved at Least 19,000 Lives, New Research Finds, State Decisions Not 
to Expand Have Led to 15,000 Premature Deaths” (Broaddus & Aron-Dine, 2019). Broddus and 
Aron-Dine’s report is based on Miller’s paper.  
 Miller’s paper establishes a necessary proposition for my thesis. That is the temporal 
decision of state legislatures to expand Medicaid under Section 2001(a) matters. In this thesis, I 
analyze a different aspect of this temporal decision.  
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 In summary, I establish the intent of Section 2001(a) to, indeed, expand Medicaid to the 
poorest in the United States, and it has extended public coverage to some 10 million people. The 
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Methodology 
 This section outlines the methodology and research design for this thesis. The research 
question is restated below. [I refer to the different questions numerically. For example, “part 1” 
is “[w]ere certain groups or demographics of the population in the 100-138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level effected differently by the Medicaid expansion policy of the ACA under Section 
2001(a)?”] 
1. Were certain groups or demographics of the population in the 100-138% of the Federal 
Poverty Level effected differently by the Medicaid expansion policy of the ACA under 
Section 2001(a)?  
2. Did a state’s temporal decision to expanded Medicaid result in a substantial difference 
between the same demographic in a different group of states? 
3. If either of the previous two questions are answered in the affirmative, were certain 
behaviors abnormal than other demographics depending on the group? 
Data 
 All of the data used was from the American Community Survey. The American 
Community Survey (ACS) is “an ongoing survey that provides vital information on a yearly 
basis about our nation and its people. Information from the survey generates data that help 
determine how more than $675 billion in federal and state funds are distributed each year” 
(United States Census Bureau, n.d.). It is administered by the United States Census Bureau. 
 I accessed this data using a service provided by the Minnesota Population Center at the 
University of Minnesota called IPUMS USA. IPUMS “collects, preserves and harmonizes U.S. 
census microdata and provides easy access to this data with enhanced documentation. Data 
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includes decennial censuses from 1790 to 2010 and American Community Surveys (ACS) from 
2000 to the present” (Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota, n.d.). 
 I created a custom dataset that contained nine samples and 38 variables. The nine samples 
are the ACS microdata years 2010 through 2018. In total, there were 28,260,215 individual 
observations in the nine samples selected. Filtering this to just individuals falling in the 100-
138% of the federal poverty line, the dataset that I worked with contained 1,856,890 individual 
observations. For each of these 1.857 million observations, I had 38 variables of information; 
they are listed in the chart below. The highlighted variables are the variables we use in the 
analysis. 
Chart 1: List of Variables 
Variable Label 
YEAR  Census year 
SAMPLE  IPUMS sample identifier 
SERIAL  Household serial number 
CBSERIAL  Original Census Bureau household serial number 
HHWT  Household weight 
CLUSTER  Household cluster for variance estimation 
STATEFIP  State (FIPS code) 
METRO  Metropolitan status 
STRATA Household strata for variance estimation 
GQ Group quarters status 
MORTGAGE  Mortgage status 
HHINCOME  Total household income 
PERNUM Person number in sample unit 
PERWT  Person weight 
SEX Sex 
AGE  Age 
RACE (general)  Race [general version] 
RACED (detailed)  Race [detailed version] 
HISPAN (general)  Hispanic origin [general version] 
HISPAND (detailed)  Hispanic origin [detailed version] 
RACAMIND  Race: American Indian or Alaska Native 
RACASIAN  Race: Asian 
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RACBLK Race: black or African American 
RACPACIS  Race: Pacific Islander 
RACWHT  Race: white 
HCOVANY  Any health insurance coverage 
HCOVPRIV  Private health insurance coverage 
HINSEMP  Health insurance through employer/union 
HINSPUR  Health insurance purchased directly 
HINSTRI  Health insurance through TRICARE 
HCOVPUB  Public health insurance coverage 
HINSCAID  Health insurance through Medicaid 
HINSCARE  Health insurance through Medicare 
EDUC (general)  Educational attainment [general version] 
EDUCD (detailed)  Educational attainment [detailed version] 
INCTOT  Total personal income 
FTOTINC  Total family income 
POVERTY Poverty status 
 
 The citation for my specific dataset is Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, 
Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas and Matthew Sobek. IPUMS USA: Version 10.0 
[dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2020. 
Methodology of Analysis 
 I began by formatting my data. I downloaded the aforementioned dataset into Stata, and 
created some variables to separate each of the observations into groups. The groups were based 
on “statefip” (a state residency variable) and Medicaid expansion status / date. Four groups were 
created: “tradexpand” (states with 2014 Medicaid expansion), “nonexpand” (states with no 
Medicaid expansion), “expand15” (states with 2015 Medicaid expansion), and “expand16” 
(states with 2016 Medicaid expansion). I also created a binary variable that indicated whether an 
observation had attained a GED or high school diploma or not. Lastly, I filtered the data to only 
include individuals aged 19 to 64. This was all created in a .do file called 
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“expansiongroupseperators.” Each time an analysis was run so was this .do file. See data 
appendix 1. 
 For each of these four groups of states, I created proportions of people enrolled in 
Medicaid by demographic. The demographics analyzed were white, black or African American, 
Asian American, Hispanic, GED attainment, male, and female. I did this using the “collapse” 
function referencing the variable “hiscaid” which indicates whether or not an individual is a 
Medicaid enrollee for that year. Thus, 9 proportions were generated for each line of code. These 
9 proportions corresponded to the year of ACS data. For example, the first line of code in data 
appendix 2 generated the percentage of whites, in nonexpansion states, enrolled in Medicaid 
from the years 2010 to 2018. Thus, 9 individual, related proportions were generated from a 
single line of code.  See data appendices 1 through 5 for the full code with annotation. 
After doing this, I aggregated the data on Excel, created regressions, and generated 95% 
confidence intervals for the trends of the proportions. I compared each of the 95% confidence 
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Summary of Assumptions 
 Before presenting the findings, this section summarizes the assumptions made throughout 
this thesis and its analysis. In the literature review, assumptions made for the data and analysis of 
this thesis and its research questions were documented. I aggregate them here for reader ease. 
1. All individuals (no matter race, sex, ethnic origin or education level) make insurance 
decisions the same if they are given the same set of options.  
2. Adverse selection in United States health insurance will not substantially impact my 
decisions.  
3. The state’s temporal decision to expand, delay, or not expand Medicaid to 138% of the 
federal poverty line matters. 
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Findings 
 After running the data and collecting it in Excel. The following charts show the 95% 
confidence interval for the slope of the linear regression by demographic for each group of states. 
It also shows a total increase in the Medicaid enrollment proportion. The Medicaid enrollment 
proportion is: 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  ே௨௠௕௘௥ ௢௙ ௜௡ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௨௔௟௦ ௘௡௥௢௟௟௘ௗ ௜௡ ெ௘ௗ௜௖௔௜ௗ
்௢௧௔௟ ௦௔௠௣௟௘ ௦௜௭௘
. All of the 
confidence intervals were extremely significant having virtually no p-value.  
Table 1: Non-expansion States, List of Regression Trend Confidence Intervals by Demographic 
 
Table 2: Traditional Expansion States, List of Regression Trend Confidence Intervals by 
Demographic 
 
List of Confidence Intervals
Demographic Lower Bound Upper Bound Total Increase (Decrease)
White 0.006165909 0.009547424 0.05785
Black 0.006203797 0.011308869 0.07052
Asian 0.002818386 0.01354228 0.04461
GED 0.006330366 0.0098993 0.05652
NonGED 0.005592275 0.009772725 0.0677
Hispanic 0.005223212 0.007782454 0.04628
Male 0.006039942 0.010153058 0.05736
Female 0.005351167 0.0092765 0.05439
Non Expansion States
Demographic Lower Bound Upper Bound Total Increase (Decrease)
White 0.02580459 0.047320073 0.24003
Black 0.020821318 0.037607349 0.19772
Asian 0.024159964 0.047853702 0.24006
GED 0.025129991 0.046790675 0.2343
NonGED 0.025206792 0.045474208 0.24564
Hispanic 0.026496604 0.04904973 0.2462
Male 0.025423661 0.045867005 0.24064
Female 0.024147078 0.046209255 0.22775
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To answer the first part of my research question, no demographics were affected 
differently by the Medicaid expansion under Section 2001(a) among the same group. All of the 
confidence intervals overlapped. For example, the white demographic in traditional expansion 
group had a regression confidence interval [0.0258, 0.0473], 2015 expansion states for whites 
was [0.02003, 0.03989] and 2016 expansion states [0.017, 0.0513]. Thus, we answer part 2 of the 
Demographic Lower Bound Upper Bound Total Increase (Decrease)
White 0.020025066 0.039894934 0.20192
Black 0.013059979 0.040085021 0.15052
Asian 0.015247468 0.056058866 0.26467
GED 0.019300182 0.041369818 0.20026
NoGED 0.019331446 0.035508887 0.19914
Hispanic 0.01456802 0.038091647 0.17788
Male 0.018970537 0.037627796 0.18748
Female 0.019405468 0.041441865 0.20478
Summary of Confidence Intervals
2015 Expansion States
Demographic Lower Bound Upper Bound Total Increase (Decrease)
White 0.016995057 0.051325277 0.25837
Black 0.01513865 0.050028684 0.21644
Asian 0.010582561 0.046073106 0.30749
GED 0.01833471 0.04940429 0.25195
NoGED 0.015163979 0.051221355 0.23328
Hispanic 0.013144572 0.039302761 0.16505
Male 0.014054029 0.042708971 0.1989
Female 0.018608048 0.053287618 0.26649
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research the same as part 1. A state’s temporal decision did not seem to have much of an impact 
on regression trends of Medicaid participation between groups.  
The third part of the research question is the most difficult to answer; however, we do 
observe an abnormality 2015 and 2016 expanders which is visualized below. For the following 
graphs, I aggregated all of the proportions by demographic and created scatter plots. See data 
appendices 6 through 13 for the raw data for the graphs below and other demographics not race. I 

















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
White Demographic Aggregated
White Demographic Aggregated Traditional Expanders
White Demographic Aggregated 2015 Expanders
White Demographic Aggregated 2016 Expanders









2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Black Demographic Aggregated 
Black Demographic Aggregated Traditional Expanders
Black Demographic Aggregated 2015 Expanders
Black Demographic Aggregated 2016 Expanders
Black Demographic Aggregated Non-Expanders
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Asian Demographic
Asian Demographic Aggregated Traditional Expanders
Asian Demographic Aggregated 2015 Expanders
Asian Demographic Aggregated 2016 Expanders








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Hispanic Demographic Aggregated
Hispanic Demographic Aggregated Traditional Expanders
Hispanic Demographic Aggregated 2015 Expanders
Hispanic Demographic Aggregated 2016 Expanders
Hispanic Demographic Aggregated Non-Expanders
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A Puzzling Trend Difference 
 
 In the 2015 expansion and 2016 expansion groups, I note a strange trend post expansion. 
In the black and Hispanic demographics, we see Medicaid enrollment decrease even with Section 
2001(a) implementation. Most significantly in 2017, significant drops in the Medicaid proportion 
occur in the Hispanic demographic in the 2015 and 2016 expansion groups. The raw data below 




For the 2015 expansion group, the Hispanic proportion dropped nearly 2.5% from 2017 
to 2018. In the 2016 expansion group, this proportion dropped 7%. For the black demographic, I 
observe the same puzzling trend. 
Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.24723 0.22022 0.11364 0.125
2011 0.25762 0.2167 0.09901 0.13161
2012 0.25879 0.28009 0.15596 0.13948
2013 0.2627 0.20088 0.19565 0.14359
2014 0.35255 0.26489 0.13333 0.14829
2015 0.447 0.31403 0.23846 0.16267
2016 0.46611 0.34694 0.21642 0.1714
2017 0.48517 0.42384 0.34884 0.17232
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For the 2015 expansion group, the black Medicaid proportion decreased 4.5% from 2017 
to 2018. In the 2016 expansion group, this proportion dropped about 4% over 2017. It is odd that 
we do not see a drop in the same groups for every race demographic. It is just in the Hispanic 
and black demographics. I allude to some reasons for why this may occur in previous sections in 
this paper, but a significant one might be access to Obamacare and Medicaid. For example, 
suppose the following. Individual A lives in Montana, a 2016 expansion state, makes 115% of 
the federal poverty line, and is Hispanic. They enrolled in Obamacare and received publicly 
subsidized, private insurance through their state’s exchange. At year end, they would collect a 
tax credit for the premiums they paid throughout that year. Louisiana expands Medicaid, so they 
enroll in 2016. Something happens and they may return to the exchange when Medicaid and 
Obamacare enrollment comes at the end of 2016 for 2017. We must imagine that if this is true 
for individual A, then why is it not happening across all demographics? 
This result is really puzzling. Why are we seeing a specific behavior in the insurance 
decision in Hispanics and blacks but not whites or Asians? Evidence does not suggest that much 
changed in healthcare in 2017. Physicians accepting Medicaid stayed relatively stable across the 
board, and there were not large changes in the number of hospitals in the states that expanded in 
2015 and 2016.  
Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.38598 0.34128 0.28958 0.24181
2011 0.41359 0.36533 0.27155 0.25746
2012 0.41421 0.35674 0.27612 0.26457
2013 0.41696 0.34153 0.29854 0.25819
2014 0.48987 0.37367 0.29778 0.28668
2015 0.5581 0.44708 0.31439 0.29374
2016 0.57495 0.54276 0.40385 0.30894
2017 0.58071 0.53689 0.5442 0.29713
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I am not sure why it is occurring, and to try and answer this question would be outside 
the scope of my thesis. Part III of my research question does attempt to analyze behavioral 
differences across demographics in the insurance decision, but unfortunately, there is not enough 
data to say anything about these trends in the black and Hispanic demographics.  
I see this trend occurring and am comfortable to say that it is not true across all race 
demographics in this study; rather, it only happens in the Hispanic and black demographics. 
There is no legislative piece or action that could have caused this trend specifically in these 
demographics. In 2017, a new president inaugurated, but I find it hard to point to this as a cause 
for a person like Individual A to change their health insurance from Medicaid to something else. 
In short, I am puzzled, and can only offer guesses about why this happens in the black and 
Hispanic demographics. 
To conclude, Medicaid adoption trends are consistent in expansionary environments 
across demographics. There is no evidence that Section 2001(a) of the ACA contributed to racial 
or demographic disparities seen in health insurance coverage. I note an unusual trend occurring 
in 5 states: Montana, Louisiana, Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Indiana where blacks and Hispanics 
are enrolling in Medicaid at expansion outset, but then switching to different types of insurance 
coverage. This primarily occurs in the 2018 enrollment period. I do not see this trend in other 
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Next Steps  
 For next steps, I would suggest finding out why we see Hispanics and blacks unenrolling 
in Medicaid in 2015 and 2016 expansion states. Finding this out would help promote more 
equitable coverage and care among these groups. Section 2001(a) has no race related language; 
however, its implementation has affected races differently and maybe significantly differently.  
 I think a study examining these odd trends in the Medicaid proportion among blacks and 
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This figure shows the Post-ACA Coverage, Access and Use of Care among Groups of Color 
Compared to Whites. Across all racial and ethnic demographics, a deterioration of access, 
coverage and use of care compared to whites occurs 
 
Taken from: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Figure 2: Post-ACA Coverage, Access, and 
Use of Care among Groups of Color Compared to Whites” by Artiga & Oregera (2019). 
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This figure shows the relative improvement by racial or ethnic demographic post ACA reform 
with all groups improving slightly lead cumulatively by Hispanics (60%) followed by whites 
(40%) and blacks (40%) then Asians (20%). 
 
Taken from: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Figure 1: Changes in Health Coverage Access, 
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Data Appendix 1: expansiongroupseperators .do file 
 
 
**Expanders in 2016, Montana and Lousiana 
 
generate expand16=0 
replace expand16=1 if statefip==30 
replace expand16=1 if statefip==22 
 
**Expanders in 2015, Alaska 02, Pennsylvania 42, Indiana 18 
 
generate expand15=0 
replace expand15=1 if statefip==02 
replace expand15=1 if statefip==42 
replace expand15=1 if statefip==18 
 
**Nonexpanders: Wyoming 56, South Dakota 46, Kansas 20, Oklahoma 40, Texas 
48, Missouri 29, Wisconsin 55,Tennesee 47, Mississippi 28, Alabama 01, 
Georgia 13, Florida 12, South Carolina 45, North Carolina 37 
 
gen nonexpand=0 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==56 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==46 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==20 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==40 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==48 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==29 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==55 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==47 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==28 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==01 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==13 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==12 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==45 
replace nonexpand=1 if statefip==37 
 
**traditional expanders: Washington 53, California 06, Nevada 32, Colorado 
08, Arizona 04, New Mexico 35, Hawaii 15, North Dakota 38, Minnesota 27, 
Iowa 19, Arkansas 05, Michigan 26, Illinois 17, Kentucky 21, Ohio 39, West 
Virginia 54, Maryland 24, Delaware 10, New York 36, Washington DC 11, New 
Jersey 34, Connecticut 09, Rhode Island 44, Massachusetts 25, New 
Hampshire 33, Vermont 50, Oregon 41 
 
gen tradexpand=0 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==53 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==06 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==32 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==08 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==04 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==35 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==15 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==38 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==27 
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replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==19 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==05 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==26 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==17 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==21 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==39 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==54 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==10 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==36 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==11 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==34 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==09 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==25 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==33 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==50 
replace tradexpand=1 if statefip==41 
 
**this variable will generate whether or not someone has attained a GED 
 
gen GED=0 
replace GED=1 if educd > 62 
 
 
** filters only to 100-138% of FPL 
keep if poverty > 99 & poverty < 139 
 
**add an age line that keeps only those with 19-64 in age 
keep if age > 18 
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Data Appendix 2: Nonexpansion States, Demographic Analysis Stata Code 
 
**Data Appendix 1 -- For Nonexpansion states White vs. Nonwhite Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**For each iteration, a dataset was uploaded and filtered using the 
"expasiongroupseperators" .do file and the master data cited as IMPUS 
__________. 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of white persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racwht == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-white persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 2 -- For Nonexpansion states Black vs. Nonblack Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Black persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racblk == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Non-black persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 3 -- For Nonexpansion States Asian vs. Nonasian Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racasian == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 4 -- For Nonexpansion States GED (or High School Dimploma) 
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**this output gives us a proportion of GED education in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of no GED education in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 5 -- For Nonexpansion States Hispanic vs. Non-hispanic 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Hispanic persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan > 0 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Hispanic persons in non-
expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 6 -- For Nonexpansion States Male vs. Female Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of male persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & sex == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of female persons in non-expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if nonexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
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Data Appendix 3: Traditional Expansion States, Demographic Analysis Stata Code 
 
**Data Appendix 1 -- For Traditional Expansion states White vs. Nonwhite 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**For each iteration, a dataset was uploaded and filtered using the 
"expasiongroupseperators" .do file and the master data cited as IMPUS 
__________. 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of white persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racwht == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-white persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 2 -- For Traditional Expansion states Black vs. Nonblack 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Black persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racblk == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Non-black persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 3 -- For Traditional Expansion States Asian vs. Nonasian 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racasian == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 4 -- For Traditional Expansion States GED (or High School 
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**this output gives us a proportion of GED education in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of no GED education in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 5 -- For Traditional Expansion States Hispanic vs. Non-
Hispanic Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan > 0 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in Traditional 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan == 0 
 
**Data Appendix 6 -- For Traditional Expansion States Male vs. Female 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of male persons in Traditional 
expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & sex == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of female persons in Traditional 
expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if tradexpand == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
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Data Appendix 4: 2015 Expansion States, Demographic Analysis Stata Code 
 
**Data Appendix 1 -- For 2015 Expansion states White vs. Nonwhite Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**For each iteration, a dataset was uploaded and filtered using the 
"expasiongroupseperators" .do file and the master data cited as IMPUS 
__________. 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of white persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racwht == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-white persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 2 -- For 2015 Expansion states Black vs. Nonblack Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Black persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racblk == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Non-black persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 3 -- For 2015 Expansion States Asian vs. Nonasian Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racasian == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 4 -- For Nonexpansion States GED (or High School Dimploma) 
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**this output gives us a proportion of GED education in 2015 Expansion 
adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of no GED education in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 5 -- For 2015 Expansion States Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan > 0 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in 2015 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 6 -- For 2015 Expansion States Male vs. Female Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of male persons in 2015 expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & sex == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of female persons in 2015 expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand15 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
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Data Appendix 5: 2016 Expansion States, Demographic Analysis Stata Code 
 
**Data Appendix 1 -- For 2016 Expansion states White vs. Nonwhite Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**For each iteration, a dataset was uploaded and filtered using the 
"expasiongroupseperators" .do file and the master data cited as IMPUS 
__________. 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of white persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racwht == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-white persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 2 -- For 2016 Expansion states Black vs. Nonblack Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Black persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racblk == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Non-black persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 




**Data Appendix 3 -- For 2016 Expansion States Asian vs. Nonasian Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Asian persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racasian == 2 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Asian persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & racasian == 1 
 
 
**Data Appendix 4 -- For Nonexpansion States GED (or High School Diploma) 
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**this output gives us a proportion of GED education in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of no GED education in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & GED == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 5 -- For 2016 Expansion States Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic 
Medicaid Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of Hispanic persons in 2016 Expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan > 0 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of non-Hispanic persons in 2016 
Expansion states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & hispan == 0 
 
 
**Data Appendix 6 -- For 2016 Expansion States Male vs. Female Medicaid 
Adoption by Year 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of male persons in 2016 expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
139 & sex == 1 
 
**this output gives us a proportion of female persons in 2016 expansion 
states adoption of Medicaid 
collapse hinscaid, by(year), if expand16 == 1 & poverty > 99 & poverty < 
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.26866 0.24063 0.19015 0.18161
2011 0.28926 0.24564 0.18741 0.18724
2012 0.28546 0.25337 0.18455 0.1924
2013 0.2945 0.25568 0.19477 0.19518
2014 0.391 0.2678 0.17951 0.20576
2015 0.47233 0.36665 0.24203 0.21905
2016 0.48847 0.40774 0.31449 0.23652
2017 0.50585 0.43571 0.42374 0.22987
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.38598 0.34128 0.28958 0.24181
2011 0.41359 0.36533 0.27155 0.25746
2012 0.41421 0.35674 0.27612 0.26457
2013 0.41696 0.34153 0.29854 0.25819
2014 0.48987 0.37367 0.29778 0.28668
2015 0.5581 0.44708 0.31439 0.29374
2016 0.57495 0.54276 0.40385 0.30894
2017 0.58071 0.53689 0.5442 0.29713
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.28343 0.21019 0.11111 0.12378
2011 0.32508 0.14835 0.27273 0.11619
2012 0.31575 0.20118 0.19608 0.10775
2013 0.30623 0.13953 0.24444 0.11001
2014 0.41361 0.17582 0.19512 0.14719
2015 0.49963 0.31183 0.22414 0.12092
2016 0.50613 0.37438 0.28261 0.15536
2017 0.53375 0.33562 0.37838 0.18494
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.26629 0.23916 0.18543 0.1767
2011 0.28562 0.24078 0.19605 0.18202
2012 0.28404 0.24789 0.19102 0.18763
2013 0.28782 0.24154 0.20973 0.19118
2014 0.38396 0.26013 0.18957 0.20652
2015 0.46483 0.36573 0.25264 0.21686
2016 0.48435 0.40245 0.32685 0.23426
2017 0.49983 0.43603 0.43265 0.22931
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.32413 0.31102 0.33948 0.22834
2011 0.36356 0.33603 0.28736 0.24418
2012 0.35178 0.36326 0.34011 0.25327
2013 0.36103 0.36299 0.35281 0.24271
2014 0.45466 0.37211 0.35749 0.26151
2015 0.53567 0.4064 0.33941 0.27184
2016 0.54172 0.50293 0.44169 0.28548
2017 0.55801 0.51133 0.57692 0.27866
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.24723 0.22022 0.11364 0.125
2011 0.25762 0.2167 0.09901 0.13161
2012 0.25879 0.28009 0.15596 0.13948
2013 0.2627 0.20088 0.19565 0.14359
2014 0.35255 0.26489 0.13333 0.14829
2015 0.447 0.31403 0.23846 0.16267
2016 0.46611 0.34694 0.21642 0.1714
2017 0.48517 0.42384 0.34884 0.17232
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.24546 0.22957 0.21231 0.1664
2011 0.27452 0.23866 0.19921 0.17596
2012 0.27151 0.2485 0.21088 0.17788
2013 0.27716 0.2494 0.2381 0.18423
2014 0.36832 0.26232 0.19931 0.20579
2015 0.45332 0.35004 0.26271 0.2102
2016 0.46122 0.40242 0.31205 0.22638
2017 0.48138 0.41851 0.42599 0.22042
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Traditional Expanders 2015 Expanders 2016 Expanders Non-Expanders
2010 0.31139 0.2731 0.23258 0.20896
2011 0.33162 0.27658 0.23095 0.21476
2012 0.32493 0.28568 0.23565 0.224
2013 0.32947 0.27477 0.23988 0.21792
2014 0.42751 0.29427 0.2415 0.22919
2015 0.50407 0.39196 0.27652 0.24431
2016 0.52768 0.43481 0.37937 0.2609
2017 0.53815 0.47353 0.48656 0.25512
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